

TOP ↑

Outside Edges of green
card indicate the edges of
the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f. 6.3

Top ↑

outside Edges of green
card indicate the edges of
the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/500 f.6.3

TCP ↑

ROLL # 80

[Even No. rolls]

[Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3]

TOP ↑

ROLL #80

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

TOP ↑

outside Edges of green
card indicate the edges of
the camera field

[Even No. rolls]

[Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3]


TOP ↑

Outside edges of green
card indicate the edges of
the camera field

[Even No. rolls]

[Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3]

Brooks 2777



CHATEAU FRONTENAC
QUEBEC

Canadian Pacific Hotels

October 28th., 1942.

Col. Wm. J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Service,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill;

Thank you very much for your letter of October 22nd. I am returning to the States next week and may follow your suggestion to get in touch with ~~Tradex~~ Davidson. I knew him years ago slightly and perhaps can get the information I want through him.

If I could get a few minutes with you I would come to Washington. I will telephone you when I get to New York to see if I can make an appointment.

Warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

Joseph W. Brooks,
Room 905,
220 East 42nd Street,
New York, N.Y.

Brooks 8777

October 22, 1942

Mr. Joseph W. Brooks,
Chateau Frontenac,
Quebec,
Canada.

Dear Joe:

I have your letter, and of course I would be very pleased
if you would give me as reference.

In relation to the Army Air Corps, I suggest you get in
touch with Trubee Davison, Assistant Secretary of War for Air,
War Department, Washington, D.C.

If I hear of anything for you, I will let you know.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

15 Oct 1942 8:11 AM

JOSEPH W. BROOKS
220 EAST 42nd STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y.
MURRAY HILL 2-8900

October 19th, 1942

Col. William J. Donovan
2 Wall Street,
New York City

Dear Bill,

I am trying to get a job ferrying aircraft for the Government and may have to give the names of several people as references. In the event I apply for a commission in the Army Air Forces, I would like to call on your good graces to give me a helping hand.

In the event you have any close connections with the Army Air Corps, I might ask you to use your influence for an interview.

I have been flying in Canada for the past eight months for the RCAF on a civilian basis, doing cross-country work in twin-engine bombers.

I sometimes feel that, with my past experience as a line officer, and with 15 years of flying, perhaps I should be in operational work. I believe you know my background and qualifications, and if you happen to see or hear of anything really interesting in Washington. I would appreciate a line from you. My address will be Chateau Frontenac, City of Quebec, Canada.

With warm personal regards, I am,

Sincerely,

JWB:MAM

Joe Brooks

Brown 88416

10/13/42

10/13/42

October 13, 1942

Rear Admiral Harold Train
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral Train:

I think you should see the attached message which came from our London office today. I understand that Brown is an OWI representative at Istanbul. We have had no dealings with him and, of course, know nothing about the subject of the message. I have so notified London.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Serial 1254
H. J. London

Plowman 8846
X O. W. S.
X Istanbul

October 13, 1942

Major General George Strong
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Strong:

I think you should see the attached message which came from our London office today. I understand that Brown is an OWI representative at Istanbul. We have had no dealings with him and, of course, know nothing about the subject of the message. I have so notified London.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Pass for tanks

Re: BOSTON
X () 100-5
X 207-16-1

October 13, 1942

Brigadier General John J. Deane
Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Public Health Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Deane:

I think you should see the attached message which
came from our London office today. I understand that
Brown is an OMI representative at Istanbul. We have
had no dealings with him and, of course, knew nothing
about the subject of the message. I have notified
London.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Call
Mr.
her
Date

TOP ↑

From The Desk Of:
Commander John Ford, U.S.N.R.
Field Photographic Branch
Office of Strategic Services

10 Nov 1942

Memo for
Mr. Murphy:

In accordance with our
telephone conversation,
there is enclosed copy
of letter requesting
services of Mr. Guy Bolte
as Lieut. (jg), U.S.N.R.

B. E. CUNNINGHAM
Captain, U.S.M.C.R.
Acting Executive Officer

(1543)

Exposure is $\frac{1}{25}$ @ f. 6.3

Bolte 9657
 x (b)(1)S
 x Field Photographic
 Bureau
 jill

1 September 1942

From: The Director of Strategic Services.
 To: The Chief of Naval Personnel.
 Via: Officer-in-Charge, Office of Naval Officer
 Procurement, New York, N. Y.
 Subject: BOLTE, Charles Guy -- Applicant for commission
 in Class D-V(3), U.S.N.R.
 Reference: (a) Nav-36-NW of 16 March 1942.
 Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. After thoroughly interviewing the subject-named man as to his professional qualifications and background, it is recommended that he be commissioned in the rank of Lieutenant (junior grade), D-V(3), U.S.N.R., to be assigned to the Office of Naval Operations, Navy Department, for further assignment with the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services as photographic officer to be in charge of a camera unit subject to immediate orders to any destination in connection with pictorial reports of the current conflict.

2. Because of the urgency of photographic missions currently being planned for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is requested that immediate action be taken in the processing of Mr. Bolte's commissioning and that the requirement that he attend the Officers' Training School be waived, (1) because of the specialized duties to which he would be assigned, and (2) because time is a vital factor in the success of the photographic ventures being undertaken by this organization.

C-O-P-Y
 AR



WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
 Director

B. E. GUNNINGHAM
 Captain, U.S.M.C.R.
 By direction

13Bomb damage 9292
+ Economic Warfare
x Mr 2 LW
x Lawrence
x Economic Warfare

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan
FROM: Edward S. Mason
SUBJECT:

DATE: November 30, 1942

I am attaching a copy of notes of a conversation with Mr. Lawrence, who is in charge of bomb damage assessment for the Ministry of Economic Warfare. I am also including copies of two papers recently prepared on this subject in the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

There are a number of other documents relating to this subject that I am having copied now, and which I shall send you presently.

E. S. M.

Attachments 3

G
O
P
Y

October 30, 1942

Conversation with Lawrence ~~MBW~~ regarding
recent analysis of bomb damage.

Within the last few months Lawrence, Col. Vickers and various others concerned with this problem have experienced a definite change in their views regarding possibilities of bomb damage. There is now a very strongly held opinion to the effect that bombing may be expected to produce decisive rather than subsidiary effects. About the heaviest tonnage dropped on Germany within any month is 13,000 - 14,000 tons, of which one fourth is assumed to have landed in the target area. As a rough guess Lawrence mentioned a figure four times this as necessary to produce the results hoped for. This tonnage would on the basis of present possibilities be mainly distributed over German urban areas within the radius London-Hanover. This observation raises two questions:

(1) Is the vulnerable population in this area a sufficient percentage of the total population to ensure that the repercussions would extend pretty much throughout the German economy?

(2) What would be the process of social disintegration involved and what sort of evidence of this disintegration would become obvious to Intelligence Services?

Lawrence thought that the answer to the first question is definitely yes. The area within practical bombing radius now contains well over 20 million distributed in occupations and in locations inseparably connected with the basic network of the German economy. It would be impossible he thinks for disintegration in this area not to extend to other areas. The magnitude of the problem involved in providing relief, strengthening administration, rebuilding damage, and so forth would constitute such a drain on German resources as to make it impossible to carry on a major war effort.

With respect to the second question there are, of course, certain roughly measurable effects such as the death rate calculated on the basis of British experience, damage to buildings readily observable by aerial reconnaissance, absenteeism in factories and so forth. Of much greater importance however than these measurable effects would be the breakdown of Government controls, administrative machinery, and in general all those social habits which are necessary to the maintenance of an orderly society.

Any particular bombing of the weight now contemplated would presumably produce haphazard and uncontrolled migration of the population away from the bombed areas, wholesale looting, the failure of the relief system to function adequately and so forth. To a certain extent evidence of such a process of disintegration would become available in the form of Governmental decrees designed to deal with the situation.

SECRET

- 2 -

Lawrence is of the opinion that the failure of the relief system to function adequately would be one of the most serious effects of bombing. He cited as an example the situation in Coventry on 16th November.

The day following the Coventry raid a cavalcade of relief vehicles of various sorts descended on Coventry, providing food, clothing, money and other things necessary to re-establish morale and to make an early return to work possible. The result was that production in the Coventry area returned to normal within a remarkably short space of time and morale continued strong.

Plymouth on the other hand, being a larger town rather far removed from other centres of population, had to wait longer for help with the result that the re-establishment of ordinary conditions of life and ordinary attitudes was greatly prolonged.

In Germany the cases of Lubeck and Karlsruhe are illuminating. The relief caravans reached Lubeck the day after the raid which was in March 1942; in Karlsruhe on the other hand which has been recently raided, it took three weeks for adequate relief measures to be applied. It is to be expected that with the increasing rate of bombing adequate relief measures will be subject to continual greater delay. Medhurst reports it took 6 weeks to provide adequate relief for Essen.

It was agreed that the limitations to the weight of bombing attacks are principally spatial and weather limitations. It is Lawrence's view that the latter are more serious. Bombers can be dispatched from a field more rapidly than they can be landed. The landing of bombers from a 1,000 bomber raid presents a very difficult problem even under ideal weather conditions. In a 2,000 bomber raid, if weather conditions turn bad, operational losses on landing might reach very serious proportions.

Lawrence thinks that it is probable that daylight precision bombing over Germany would be very difficult if not impossible against German anti-aircraft defences. If it is possible he thinks that the primary targets should be aircraft plants. The greater the emphasis placed on bombing attacks from England the higher the priority which should be attached to the German aircraft industries as a target. He thinks that the primary object of daylight bombing over Germany will probably be the marking of the target for night attack. He gave as an example the recent raid on Berlin. The daylight bombers reached the target about five or six o'clock. During the night a cloud covering existed which would ordinarily have precluded reaching the target, but fires started in the day time made the city area clearly visible.

SECRET

- 3 -

Lawrence's parting comment with regard to the role of bombing was to the effect that tactical changes in the use of aircraft are extremely rapid. He emphasised it by saying that there have been greater tactical changes in aircraft in the last three months than the tactical changes in the use of ships over the last 200 years.

This observation, of course, cuts both ways. The changes in technique may be expected to occur may quickly increase the efficiency of air attack or it may quickly improve defences against air attack.

Hedhurst said at lunch that a first line strength of 4,000 bombers could easily average 60-70,000 tons of bombs dropped in Germany per month. He would expect such first line strength to be built up before the Spring of 1944.

SECRET

ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE NIGHT BOMBING OFFENSIVE
MARCH - SEPT. 1942

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

SECRET

1. In this period Bomber Command has in 85 major raids dropped 13,983 tons of R.E. and 11,565 tons of incendiaries on 26 built-up areas containing a population of approximately 8.8 million inhabitants and about 2.6 million dwellings. The total population is about 83 millions and the total number of dwellings at the outbreak of war (17.3 millions) was admitted to be about 1½ millions less than was required to house the population adequately.

2. The devastation of whole sections of built-up areas which results from the tactical methods employed is estimated to have had the following economic effects*:-

I. DIRECT EFFECTS**(a) Destruction and damage to dwellings.**

89,000 dwellings are thought to have been demolished and 166,000 damaged so seriously as to have become temporarily uninhabitable; these together represent about 10% of the dwellings in the raided areas and 1½% of the total number of dwellings in Germany. The number of persons displaced by such damage is estimated at over 750,000 - about 8½% of the population in the area affected and 1% of the total population. The number actually evacuated for reasons of policy may be and probably is larger. Some of the displaced persons can probably be rehoused in a proportion of the 166,000 damaged houses when these have been rendered habitable. On the other hand it is estimated that there are a further 127,000 damaged houses which, though habitable at present, may rapidly become uninhabitable through stress of weather unless immediate repairs are carried out.

The above estimate takes no account of slightly damaged houses the number of which may amount to 1 million. Unless damage to windows, doors, partitions etc., can be rapidly made good in such cases, the stress of living in them during the winter and the consumption of fuel, light etc., will be greatly increased.

The alternative accommodation which exists in barracks, labour camps etc. is mostly unsuitably located for the housing of industrial workers and is in any case already largely occupied for military hospitals, housing of P/W and foreign workers etc.

There is ample evidence in administrative measures of the acuteness of the housing problem which has already been caused.

* These conclusions are invariably based on partial information and are therefore subject to wide margins of error. The assumptions used are deliberately conservative, and include the assumption that only 25% of the bomb load has fallen in built-up areas.

SECRET

- 2 -

(b) Destruction and damage to factories, commercial property, and the interruption of public utility services and communications.

With the methods of attack now employed such damage, though large, occurs incidentally and is best regarded as a bonus accrued over and above the main dividend earned under I(a). It has been ensured that the war is shall be maximized by the selection as targets of built-up areas containing the largest proportion of war production and essential industry.

In view of the direction of the major proportion of the attack, it is probable that steel production has suffered more severely than any other activity. On the basis of damage known to have been inflicted on six steel plants in the Ruhr and Saar, it is estimated that the enemy has suffered a gross loss of 1,250,000 tons of finished steel output - equivalent to 5% of the estimated output of finished iron and steel in German Europe in 1942. The gross loss will be partially offset by the opening up of new steel capacity in Eastern France, but owing to the delay in starting up and making available raw material, a net loss, which cannot at present be calculated, will undoubtedly remain.

Known major damage to aircraft works is estimated to have resulted in the loss of production of 60 heavy bombers, 60 dive bombers, 40 fighters, and 85 other aircraft.

Owing to the length of the production period, the full effects of damage at shipyards and U-boat construction take some time to become visible. In view of the low vulnerability of shipyards to aerial attack, the effects will not prove to be large, but some considerable delay may have occurred, as a result of major damage to workshops, at four yards where approximately 35 U-boats have been under construction or fitting out.

The output of A.F.V's, M.T. and diesel engines for all purposes at the Humboldt-Deutz factories at Cologne is thought to have suffered a 10-15% reduction over an indefinite period. Serious damage to the oil works at Russelsheim has interrupted the production of important quantities of special motor components required by other assembly factories and for Wehrmacht spares.

The output of 30 locomotives has been lost through damage to the Henschel works and substantial numbers have also been destroyed in railway yards.

The cumulative effects of bombing on industrial activity have been well illustrated by serious damage to important heavy engineering and machine tool factories at Dusseldorf and Duisburg whose services would undoubtedly be required to repair the damage to steelworks already described.

II. INDIRECT EFFECTS**(a) Loss of working time and interruption of traffic movements due to**

SECRET

- 3 -

General dislocation.

No adequate technique at present exists for a quantitative assessment of this factor but there is plentiful evidence of loss of production through fatigue, loss of sleep, absenteeism, increased time spent in travel and civil defence work, interruption to communications and public utility services etc.

It is probable that in heavily raided towns there has been a general decline in output ranging from 10% to 30% and of duration up to 2 months after each heavy attack.

Coal mining has probably suffered more severely than any other industry both on account of the direction of a high proportion of the attack against coal-producing areas and owing to the particular vulnerability of coal output to transport dislocation and absenteeism. Daily output in the Ruhr-Saar-Aachen fields is reported to have fallen by 18% and on the assumption that the average duration of the decline was two months, the loss of output would be 4 million tons out of an annual total of 143 million tons for these districts and 186 million tons for the whole of Germany.

After heavy attacks rail movements of coal from W. Germany to Italy have fallen by proportions varying from 20% to 40% over periods varying from 2 to 4 weeks.

(b) Allocation of manpower and materials to rehabilitation measures.

Photographic reconnaissance has shown the reduced ability of the authorities to make good the growing scale of damage, even to keypoints.

It is provisionally estimated that the labour requirements to deal with the scale of housing damage assessed in I(a) may amount to the employment of 100,000 men for an indefinite period, apart from the labour required for internal repairs, repair of factories, communications and public utility services, and manufacture of the materials needed.

The reserves of clothing, furniture, household goods etc., accumulated to meet emergencies have proved wholly insufficient and in many cases have themselves been destroyed. Additional requirements of clothing alone for replacements over the past seven months are estimated at 6000/7000 tons (in terms of yarn) compared with a present annual output (including military requirements) at 250,000/300,000 tons. Owing to the reduction of the manufacture of consumption goods in order to release manpower, stocks in the shops have proved insufficient even though sales in bombed areas have been restricted entirely to authentic air-raid victims. Other expedients such as auction sales of looted goods, having also failed to meet the demand, the Reichswirtschaftsministerium has now announced that the manufacture of essential consumption goods will be greatly increased. In present circumstances this can only be achieved at the expense of war production.

M.D.7/C.I.2.
20.10.42

ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE (APRIL - JUNE 1942)

1. In the seven months under review Bomber Command carried out 15 major night raids on 26 built-up areas and dropped 13,683 tons of A.M. and H.M. bombs and incendiaries (see annex for details).
2. The economic effects of the tactical methods of bombing now employed, which result in the devastation of whole built-up areas, may be classified as follows:-

Direct Effects (a) Destruction and damage to dwellings.

- (b) Destruction and damage to factories and commercial property and the interruption of public utility services and communications.

Indirect Effects (a) Loss of working time in undamaged factories due to general dislocation of economic life.

- (b) Expenditure of manpower and material in rehabilitation measures.

The attempts which follow at measurement of these factors, based as they are on partial information or deduction from experience in Great Britain, are necessarily subject to wide margins of error; the most conservative of the various possible assumptions have however always been used.

2. Destruction and damage to dwellings and displacement of population.

Table I estimates housing damage in Germany on the basis of experience in England*; figures of damage in Great Britain for the whole war period up to July 31st, 1942 have been added for purposes of comparison:-

TABLE I
Estimate of Dwellings Damaged and Persons Displaced

SECRET

Demolished or fit only for demolition

Seriously damaged and uninhabitable *

Damaged & requiring immediate repair **

Slightly damaged ***

	Germany (Mar/Sept. 1942)		U.K. (up to 7/31/42)	
	No. of dwellings	No. of persons displaced	London	Provinces
Demolished or fit only for demolition	89,400	268,250	67,857	71,421
Seriously damaged and uninhabitable *	166,000	498,200))
Damaged & requiring immediate repair **	127,750	-) 1,359,236) 1,458,242 **
Slightly damaged ***))

* A paper is available showing the method of calculation and assumption used. The latter include the assumption that not more than 25% of the total bomb load during the period fell in a built-up area.

- 2 -

NOTES:- β some of these will probably be rendered habitable again after extensive repairs; in other cases the repair work necessary will be so great that the work has probably been postponed till the end of the war.

** without immediate repair, such houses would become uninhabitable under stress of weather.

*** No estimate of this category in Germany is yet available but if the British ratio proves applicable the number might be as large as 1 million. The damage would vary from broken windows and blasted doors to fairly ~~severe~~ structural damage.

**** of which 1,250,429 were "slightly damaged".

SECRET

The estimated total of 255,000 dwellings demolished or temporarily uninhabitable compares with a total of about 26 million dwellings in the cities attacked and about 17.8 million dwellings in the whole Reich. The estimate of 765,000 persons displaced compares with 8.8 million inhabitants in the cities attacked and a total population of 83 millions (including 10 millions in the Armed Forces and 5 million P/T and foreigners) in the whole of Germany.

At the outbreak of war the housing shortage was much more acute in Germany than in England and there was an immediate need for some $1\frac{1}{2}$ million additional dwellings. Substantial spare accommodation of a sort existed in the shape of military barracks, youth camps etc. but this, though sometimes suitable for the housing of evacuated women and children, is for the most part unfavorably situated to be of value in housing industrial workers. Much of this accommodation is moreover known to have been taken up for military hospitals and for P/T and foreign workers whose arrival has largely offset the temporary relief to the housing situation afforded by the calling of men to the colours.

That, in these circumstances, the modest damage already inflicted has raised a big housing problem for the authorities is shown by the administrative measures which have already been taken. These include:-

- (a) Compulsory registration of empty premises.
- (b) Reconversion of flats which have become offices and the billeting of the evicted firms in barracks or hutsments. (such conversions are now state-subsidized).
- (c) Compulsory division of large dwellings (also encouraged by financial assistance) and compulsory sub-letting of empty rooms.
- (d) Erection of "substitute dwellings" (State loans are available for this).

- 3 -

SECRET

(e) Diversion of Youth Hostels for "war tasks".

(f) Inviction of foreign workers from cities, labour in mines and land and their movement into huts and huts.

Germans are very house-proud and do not take kindly to billeting; householders are known to have been sent to concentration camps for maltreatment of persons billeted on them.

a. Destruction and damage to factories and commercial property and Interruption of public utilities and communications.

With the methods of attack now employed such damage represents a bonus accruing over and above the main dividend of shattered houses and displaced citizens, though it has been ensured that the bonus shall be as large as possible by the selection as targets of built-up areas containing the largest proportion of war production and essential industry.

The overall effect on German production cannot be assessed without access to highly secret German official statistics and even then it would not be easy to disentangle the effects of bombing from the influence of extraneous factors.

Owing to the big concentration of attack upon the heavy industry area of the Ruhr, it is probable that steel production has suffered more heavily than any other industry. On the basis of damage * known to have occurred to five steel plants in the Ruhr and one in the Saar, with a combined capacity of 5.5 million tons of pig iron and 7 million tons of steel per annum, it is estimated that the enemy has lost an output of 1.5 million tons in terms of finished steel products from these works. This is equivalent to 5% of the estimated output of finished iron and steel products of German Europe in 1942. The net loss will not be as large as this since in order to offset damage in the Ruhr, idle steel works have been restarted in Eastern France, but the gross loss cannot wholly be made good by these means owing to the delay in starting-up and in the organization of fuel and raw material supplies. Moreover the above estimate takes no account of loss of output in the steel industry generally, through blackout difficulties and damping down during air-raid warnings. In this connection it is of interest that of the total loss of finished steel production by enemy action in Great Britain in 1941 (18 works were actually hit), 95% was attributable to interruption by warnings and only 5% to direct damage.

No other industry is likely to have suffered as heavily as this in proportion to its total capacity but (apart from the results of special operations against French factories and the W.A.N. works at Augsburg) a number of important industrial plants have been severely damaged. Some outstanding incidents are:-

Aircraft Industry. The combination of damage to assembly shops and components factories is estimated to have resulted in the loss altogether of 2 months' * from aerial reconnaissance and reliable intelligence reports, henceforth denoted as (P.R. or (I.).)

- 4 -

output \$ by the Heinkel factories at Rostock. At least an equal effect is likely to have been produced by the more recent damage (P.R.) to the Focke Wulf assembly plants and its satellite factories*. The Weser Flugzeugbau, also at Bremen, has been reported (I) as suffering a loss of about 16% of its normal production ** over six months due to "bottlenecks", which may have been created in part by the bombing of component factories. This works has since suffered heavy direct damage and will probably lose two months' output.

Shipbuilding. Owing to the length of the production period, the effect of damage to shipyards inflicted during this period upon the rate of completion of U-boats would hardly be visible as yet. In view of the low degree of vulnerability of shipyards to aerial attack, the results obtained must inevitably be a great deal less in relation to the effort expended than in the case of most other targets. Serious damage to workshops is however known to have been done in the yards at Kiel, (Germania Werft - twice), Emden, Flensburg and to a smaller extent at Wilhelmshaven.*** Some slowing up in construction can confidently be expected and the delays at Emden and Flensburg may prove substantial.

A.F.V's and M.T. Both direct damage (P.R.) and general dislocation (I) have produced a substantial loss of output (assessed by one source as 10/15% "for an indefinite period") by the Humboldt-Deutz factories at Cologne (producing A.F.V's, M.T., and diesel engines for all purposes).

Recent information (P.R. and I) suggests the partial destruction of the most important Opel factory at Russelsheim which, in addition to making army cars, supplied specialized components to a number of other factories assembling lorries and may have been one of the largest suppliers of spare parts to the Wehrmacht.

Locomotives. Damage to the main construction shop at one of the Henschel factories (P.R.) is reported (I) to have caused the loss of production of 30 locomotives; this would be equivalent to 25% of the annual output of this concern (the largest locomotive builder in Germany) in peace-time but probably does not represent more than 10% of the programme to which it is now working. The total output for German Europe in 1942 may be 2000-25000 models.

* The output was estimated (Jan 1942) at:- He. 60 - 10 per month
 He.111 - 20 " "
 He.114 - 10 " "
 He.115 - 10 " "
 He.177 - 5 " "

* Estimated output per month:- 20 x F.W. 190, 5 x F.W.200, 12 x F.W. 189,
 2 x F.W. 58.

** Estimated output: 30 x Ju. 87 per month.

*** No. of U-boats under construction Fitting out
 Wilhelmshaven 10 -
 Emden 5 2
 Flensburg 7 -
 Kiel (Germania Werft) 7 5

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

Other Engineering. The cumulative effects of heavy and persistent air-raids are well illustrated by the heavy damage which has been inflicted on important heavy engineering and machine-tool factories in Dusseldorf and Duisburg. Among these are some of the largest makers in Germany * of steel-works equipment whose services would certainly be required in making good the damage to steelworks described earlier.

4. Loss of working time and interruption of traffic movements due to general dislocation.

Although plentiful evidence of loss of production due to fatigue, loss of sleep, absenteeism, increased time spent in travel and civil defence work, interruption to communications and public utility services etc. is available, its expression in quantitative terms presents equal difficulties.

It has been reported (I) that at the time of the heaviest raids on the Ruhr and Saar, daily coal output (which is particularly susceptible to transport dislocation and absenteeism) fell by 18%. As the duration of the loss has not been reported the overall effect cannot be measured. On the assumption that output suffered this degree of interruption over an average period of two months the total loss of production would be 4 million tons out of a total annual output of hard coal of 14 million tons in the districts concerned and 186 million tons in the whole of Germany.

Following the heavy raids on the Ruhr & Rhineland in May and June, movements of coal by various rail routes from Germany to Italy were observed (I) to fall by proportions varying from 20% to 40% over periods varying from 2 weeks to 4 weeks.

No other industry is likely to have suffered as severely as this. But all industries in the most heavily raided towns such as Cologne, Dusseldorf, Duisburg, Bremen, Karlsruhe, Lubeck, Rostock, Emden etc., are likely to have suffered a decline in output ranging from 10% to 30% and of duration up to two months after a heavy attack.

5. Allocation of manpower and materials to rehabilitation measures.

There is clear evidence in photographs that the rate at which damage has been inflicted in the past seven months has outstripped the repair allocations made by the German authorities. Whereas in the earlier stages of the bomber offensive repairs were executed with great speed, not only to war factories but also to dwellings, work on the repair of even key-points is now seen to proceed more slowly, and damaged premises of low priority may often not be touched for weeks.

Estimates of the scale of labour and raw materials required to deal with damage to housing as assessed in Para. 3 are not yet complete but there is no doubt that the resources at present available to meet it are entirely inadequate. In a good pre-war year the German building industry constructed about 220,000 dwellings. But by 1942 both the building industry and the industries

* Such as Demag of Duisburg and Schiess & Dries of Dusseldorf.

SECRET

- 6 -

which supply it with raw materials have been drained of labour for the armed forces and munitions industries. Even in peace-time a repair programme covering nearly 300,000 houses would be a formidable load on the industry, and the industry now, with reduced resources, has to cope also with the prior requirements of damage to war industries and communications. Experience in Bath, Exeter, Norwich and York shows that each ton of bombs dropped in a built-up area gives rise immediately to a demand for the labour of 15/20 men to work on demolition, clearance, first-aid repairs and eventually more permanent repair work to houses alone, and that this demand may persist for a matter of months.

On this basis, and on the most conservative assumptions of the effective percentage of bomb-loads, labour requirements in Germany for similar purposes over the past seven months are likely to have exceeded 100,000 men. This makes no allowance for the demands on manpower for the repair of factories and communications, for interior repair to houses and for the manufacture of the raw materials needed.

Not the least important aspect of widespread damage to cities is the loss of interior fittings, furniture, bedding, and other household goods, clothing both in damaged houses and in shops.* Much of this cannot, need not, and will not be replaced. Some stores ("Katastrophenlager") had been accumulated in anticipation of vital needs but many of these consisted of reserved stocks in shops and commercial warehouses and have been destroyed along with the rest of the town. Moreover manufacture of such articles has been so severely contracted in order to provide manpower for other purposes that new output is insufficient even to meet normal wear and tear. It is now clear that the various expedients adopted** have been quite inadequate to meet even the most vital and immediate needs of air-raid victims, and a high Nazi official*** has now admitted that it has been necessary to arrange for greatly increased manufacture of consumption goods immediately. This can of course only be achieved by the diversion of labour and materials from other activities previously considered to be of greater importance.

* Preliminary investigation of British experience indicates that clothing requirements alone may amount (in terms of yarn) to 1 ton per ton of bombs dropped in a built-up area. At a similar rate, German requirements in the past seven months may have been 6000/7000 tons as compared with a current annual output of yarns for clothing purposes (civil and military) of 250,000 - 300,000 tons.

** e.g. auction sales of second-hand goods obtained from the clothing collections and by looting of the Jews and the Occupied Territories; also the ban on purchases from shops in bombed areas except by authentic air-raid victims.

*** Dr. Landfried, Secretary of State in the Reichswirtschaftsministerium in a speech at Luxembourg as reported by D.N.B. October 12, 1942.

SECRET

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NIGHT BOMBING IN THE WAR OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The relative strength of the three teams into which the German working population (including prisoners of war and foreign workers) has been organized for total war is now (October 1942):-

I. <u>Armed Forces</u> (incl. auxiliaries, police and civil defence)	24.0.
II. <u>Munitions</u> (supplying war material to I.)	15.8.
III. <u>Civil Industry</u> (engaged in maintenance of the national economy)	
(a) Agriculture & Forestry	28.0%
(b) More Essential Industries	15.1.
(c) Less Essential Industries	17.0.
	<hr/> 100.0.

2. The German authorities have admitted that no further transfers from Class III to Classes I or II can now be made. This implies that Class III has now been reduced to the minimum consistent with the maintenance of the present war effort. This minimum is not static and at this stage of the war may be expected to increase.

3. The urban working population (roughly Groups II, IIIB and IIIC) constitute 48% of the total and are divided as to two-thirds between industries engaged in maintaining the national economy and one-third in the munitions industries.

4. Successful night bombing of cities increases, in a cumulative manner, the proportion of the national resources which must be devoted to the civil industries if the national economy is to be secured at the minimum necessary level of efficiency for the maintenance of the war effort. In the face of continued and increasing bombing of their industrial cities, the German administration is accordingly faced with the problem of deciding between the three following courses of action:-

- (a) To allow the allocation of resources to civil industry to fall below the minimum needed to maintain the national economy. This would reduce the endurance of the whole war machine, accelerate the pace at which it would otherwise run down, and court defeat by collapse of the home front.

SECRET

- 2 -

- (b) To divert an increased proportion of the effort of the Armed Forces and the munitions industries to defensive measure in order to hold off the bombers. This could only be at the expense of a reduction in the effort devoted to offensive warfare outside the boundaries of the Reich.
- (c) To divert manpower, materials and productive capacity back from the Armed Forces and munitions industries to the civil industries. This could only be at the expense of the enemy's military power in general.

5. In practice no clear-cut choice of one alternative at the expense of the other two is probable. A fusion, or confusion, of all three is the most likely outcome, coupled with an increased drive to mobilize the manpower and productive resources of occupied and neutral Europe. But the imposition upon the enemy of the necessity of adopting any or all of these courses could not fail to hasten the end of the war.

A.B.W./I.I.2.
18.10.42.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NIGHT BOMBING AS A WEAPON OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

1. The total war effort of the German nation is contributed by three distinct teams*::

- (a) The Armed Forces and their auxiliaries (police, civil defence, Todt organization etc.)
- (b) The Munitions Industries, engaged in manufacturing war material for (a).
- (c) The Civil Industries, engaged in the maintenance of the national economy as a whole.

The present relative size of the three teams is best shown by a breakdown of the allocation of the total working population in Germany (including P/W and foreigners) (Table I.) For comparison this also gives the position in May 1939 (before mobilization).

* There is a fourth class of non-occupied persons (old people, women and children) which, while drawing goods and services from the national pool for its maintenance, contributes nothing to it with the important exception of the housework of "unoccupied" married women.

- 3 -

TABLE I.

SECRET

ALLOCATION OF WORKING POPULATION (MEN & WOMEN)

G. L. R. M. N. Y.
(incl. P. T. and foreign exchange)

	May 1939 Millions	June '39	October 1942 Millions	1942
I. ARMED FORCES. (Incl. police, civil defence, Trot organization, etc.)	2.00	5.5	10.00	24.0
II. MUNITIONS. (Metals, Engineering, Chemicals)**	5.43	14.9	6.58	15.2
III. CIVIL INDUSTRIES.				
(a) <u>Agriculture & Forestry</u>	10.62	29.2	11.62	28.0
(b) <u>More Essential Industries</u>				
Mining	0.80	2.2	0.78	1.9
Administration & Public				
Utilities	2.29	6.3	2.38	5.7
Transport	1.69	4.6	1.65	4.0
Food, Drink & Tobacco	1.66	4.6	1.45	3.5
	6.43	17.7	6.26	15.1
(c) <u>Less Essential Industries</u>				
Building, clothing, profes-				
sions, finance, commerce etc.	11.94	32.8	7.10	17.0
TOTAL OF III.	28.99	79.6	24.98	60.1
GRAND TOTAL	36.42	100.0	41.56	100.0

NOTES: * Including in October 1942, 2 million P/M and 3 million foreigners.

** The inclusion of the whole of these industries in Class II results in a slight over-estimate of this class since part of their production is still for civil purposes but there is no means of estimating its magnitude. However a proportion of the persons in Class III are engaged wholly in supplying the Armed Forces.

SECRET

- 4 -

2. The German authorities have admitted that the further expansion of the munitions industries (and by inference the Armed Forces) depends directly or indirectly upon the recruitment of more foreign workers, (or the sub-contracting of work in Occupied Territories and neutral countries)*. This is a tacit admission that Class III has been reduced to the minimum consistent with the maintenance of the war effort. That this is highly probable could be seen by a comparison of the proportions of the total working population in Classes III b and III c with the proportions of the total British working population in similar classes. The resources available at this stage of the war for the Armed Forces and munitions production are therefore seen to consist of the surplus available after the very large minimum necessary for maintaining the national economy has been provided. This minimum is not static. As economic exhaustion (particularly of capital equipment requiring replacement)** increases with the progress of the war, so the minimum allocation of resources necessary for the maintenance of the national economy also tends to increase. That the allocation of manpower to Class III is still nearly as large as at the beginning of the war is due in part to the effects of the blockade*** and in part to the reduction in the productivity of labour.**** Provided that the growing leaks in the blockade can be plugged and that the recruitment of suitable foreign labor continues to be as difficult as hitherto, the minimum allocation required for Class III can be expected, at this stage of the war, to increase.

3. Night bombing, in its present tactical application, operates by the impartial devastation of whole built-up areas. The two principal results are:-

- (a) loss of productive capacity by direct damage to factories and commercial property and the interruption of public utility services and communications.
- (b) loss of man hours and reduction in output in the factories which remain undamaged owing to damage to housing and to the general dislocation of the highly complicated services and amenities of urban civilization, the development of which over the past fifty years has

* There has been some evidence of an increase in such sub-contracting in recent months and the pressure on France to secure additional skilled workers is now notorious.

** of the recent greatly increased priority which Germany has given to the manufacturer of locomotives, rolling stock and machine tools.

*** by compelling the locking-up of manpower in efforts to achieve greater self-sufficiency, of which the addition of 1 million persons to the number of agricultural workers is the outstanding example.

**** due to the dilution of the labour force with women and foreign workers whose productivity is less than the workers they have substituted, and to plain exhaustion.

† ignoring human casualties which are the least significant factor.

SECRET

- 5 -

been responsible (largely unnoticed) for much of the increase in the productivity of labour.

At a certain stage, the effects become cumulative and ~~invariably~~ -- for instance (b) may often result in part from (a).

Since the civil industries form by far the largest section of the national economy (see Table I.) the law of averages ensures that the loss of output from both causes falls most largely upon them as these industries have now been contracted to the minimum necessary for the maintenance of the national economy, the need to re-locate additional manpower, material and productive capacity for their rehabilitation (and this includes the repair of damaged houses)** must now enjoy nearly as high a priority as the needs of the armed forces and munitions industries. At the same time air raids are operating to reduce the productivity of the resources already engaged in such activities which gives rise to a further demand for reinforcements. The combined effect is to increase, in a cumulative manner, the proportion of the national resources which must be devoted to the civil industries if the national economy is to be secured at the minimum necessary level of efficiency for the maintenance of the war effort.

4. In such a situation, the German administration is faced with the problem of deciding between the three following courses of action:-

- (a) To allow the allocation of resources to civil industry to fall below the minimum needed to maintain the national economy. This would reduce the endurance of the whole war machine, accelerate the pace at which it would otherwise run down and court defeat by the collapse of the home front.
- (b) To divert an increased proportion of the effort of the armed forces and the munitions industries to defensive measures in order to hold off the bombers. This could only be at the expense of a reduction in the effort devoted to offensive warfare outside the boundaries of the Reich.
- (c) To divert manpower materials and productive capacity back from the armed forces and the munitions industries to the civil industries. This could only be at the expense of his military power in general.

In practice no clear-cut choice of one alternative at the expense of the other two is probable. A fusion, or confusion, of all three is the most likely outcome, coupled with an increased drive to mobilize the manpower and productive resources of occupied and neutral Europe. But the imposition upon the enemy of the necessity of adopting any or all of these courses could not fail to hasten the end of the war.

H...1/1.2.
12.10.72

- 6 -

* but, in practice, dislocation of war industries is maximized by
as targets, from among the towns tactically suitable for attack
containing the highest proportion of war industries.

** in view of the effect of the acute housing shortage
spent in travel etc., on the productivity

(PLEASE NOTE that the above two notes are incomplete. This is because the
original from which this is copied was a carbon copy, on which the carbon
had slipped.)

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 28, 1942

Subject: Assignment of Officer

To: The Adjutant General
Washington, D. C.

1. It is requested that 1st Lieutenant Edwin David Bonner, O-461768, Signal Corps, now on duty in the Military Personnel Department, Signal Corps, Room 3E-287, Pentagon Building, Arlington, Virginia, be transferred to the Office of Strategic Services, Room 2039, Temporary Building "Q", Washington, D. C.

2. This officer possesses experience and ability which are deemed essential in connection with a secret training program being conducted by this office, and his contemplated duty is communications work in the field. The particular assignment for which transfer of this officer is requested has been approved by the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff.

3. It is further requested that this officer report for duty in Washington, D. C., not later than December 5, 1942.

4. The assignment of this officer should be charged against the allotment of commissioned personnel for the Office of Strategic Services approved by the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum to the Director of Strategic Services, dated November 1, 1942.


William J. Donovan
Director

וְיִתְּהַלֵּךְ תְּהַלֵּךְ וְיִשְׁאַלְתָּא
וְיִשְׁאַלְתָּא וְיִשְׁאַלְתָּא וְיִשְׁאַלְתָּא

A3 201-Banner, Edwin D.
(11-28-42)PO-A

1st Ind.

WCM-Group-Page-1510

War Department, A.G.O., Washington, D. C., December 9, 1942. To: Director, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.

Request in basic communication is not favorably considered as the services of 1st Lt. Edwin D. Bonner are urgently needed in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer.

REF 11-1211

W. C. MacMillan
Mutant General.

Adjutant General.

Coppy to / Wm

Borah, Woodrow Wilson 7367
X War Dept. Personnel

Borah, Woodrow Wilson

November 13, 1942

Subject: Appointment in the Army of the United States.

To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. Under the provisions of AR 606-10 and Paragraph 5.d of a memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Services of Supply, subject, "Procurement of Officers for the Army of the United States From Civil Life", dated October 31, 1942, it is recommended that the following named person be appointed in the Army of the United States to the grade and for the duty as indicated below:

- a. Woodrow Wilson Borah
- b. Grade for which recommended: 2nd Lieutenant for duty with the Office of Strategic Services, branch immaterial.
- c. The proposed appointment is within the procurement objective authorized in paragraph 2 of a memorandum from the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff to the Director of Strategic Services, subject, "Officers for the Office of Strategic Services," dated November 1, 1942.
- d. Type of service or character of duty: The duty proposed is of a secret nature in connection with the work being undertaken by this organization under authority of a directive issued by the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff in a letter dated February 25, 1942. The particular duty to which this applicant will be assigned is in the Department of Research and Analysis, in which department he has been employed and trained as a civilian. He is the best qualified man available for the particular assignment for which his appointment is requested.
- e. Applicant's special qualifications: This applicant possesses special ability of a technical

七

and professional nature qualifying him for duty as a commissioned officer. He has received special secret training while an employee of this organization, particularly fitting him for the position to which he will be assigned. He is a linguist and a trained research analyst. He is a graduate of the University of California at Los Angeles, where he received A.B., M.A., and P.H.D. degrees. The duty proposed cannot be performed by him as a civilian.

g. Citizenship: United States by birth.

h. Applicant is an employee of this office and no release to this organization is necessary.

i. Waiver recommended: It is recommended that "Defective vision (OS 20-200)" be waived in this case. This physical defect has not interferred with the ability of the applicant in carrying out his duties while employed by this organization.

j. Draft Classification: Applicant not classified in Class "A" and is not scheduled for induction. (See Inclosure #6).

k. If appointed, it is recommended that applicant be ordered to extended active duty at Washington, D. C. with the Office of Strategic Services.

l. Waiver of 14 days' notice for active duty is attached. (See Inclosure #6).

m. The duties to be performed by the applicant cannot be adequately performed by him in a civilian capacity.

William J. Donovan
Director

Dr. Ball dictated

Urgent
✓ T. Stanger Attn:
✓ W. Brandt
✓ B. E. in
✓ Germany

September 18, 1942

Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong
Foreign Affairs
45 East Sixty-fifth Street
New York, New York

Copy to Dr. Macom
9/19/42

Dear Ham:

Thank you for your letter of September 16 with the enclosure of Dr. Brandt's memorandum.

I had the pleasure of meeting Dr. Brandt last winter and was much impressed by him. I am told that he is probably the ablest expert on European food conditions in this country. The Economics Division of this office has frequently called him in for consultation to their very great advantage.

The memorandum on bombing attacks against Germany impresses me as penetrating and thoughtful. The conclusions, as you probably know, are in fairly close conformity with present British and American bombing practice in Europe. Students of German economics, both here and in England, have come to the conclusion the German transportation system is about the most vulnerable part of the whole economy. The recent series of attacks on locomotives and trains in Germany and France, as well as the consistent attempt to bomb railway junctions, loading yards and so forth, bear this out.

The most serious limitation to Dr. Brandt's proposal, as I see it, is that its successful operation would require very heavy day-light bombing. A large part of this bombing would have to take place without fighter protection, with resultant heavy loss. Large-scale bombing to date has only

Mr. Armstrong

- 2 -

September 18, 1942

been possible at night, and night bombing precludes the accuracy which is really necessary to attack successfully the kind of objective which Dr. Brandt has in mind.

Despite this objection Dr. Brandt's memorandum seems to me to be of sufficient importance to deserve the fullest consideration. I intend, therefore, to put it in the hands of our representatives in London, who are working on targets for the Eighth Air Force.. I think from my talk with our Air Force, there, that this memorandum would be of great interest to them. In fact certain of them are keen on daylight bombing.

I am very grateful to you for sending Dr. Brandt's memorandum to me and also for calling my attention to his forthcoming article in the October number of "Foreign Affairs."

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO Mr. J. R. Murphy
FROM Edward S. Mason *Esm.*

The attached may serve as a basis for a reply to
Mr. Armstrong. I introduced Brandt to the Colonel last winter
and he probably remembers him.

I am keeping the memorandum to have it copied, and I
should like to send a copy to Chandler Morse in London. Morse
is heading up a unit ~~They are~~ working on targets for the
Eighth Air Force.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
EDITOR

September 16, 1942

45 EAST SIXTY-FIFTH STREET
NEW YORK
CABLE ADDRESS: FOIAFFAIRS, NEW YORK

Colonel William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Karl Brandt, formerly head of the Department of Agriculture at the University of Berlin and now in the Food Research Institute in California, is one of my best German friends and one of those whose opinions I value most. He has just sent me a copy of a memorandum which he prepared for Milo Perkins at E.S.W. He tells me that Perkins has not even acknowledged its receipt and, as the subject seems important, he suggested that I might like to pass it along to one or two other persons in Washington who might read it with profit. I hope you will find it interesting.

Yours as ever,

Hamilton Armstrong

P.S. Brandt has an interesting article on German man power in the October issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, published today. I think it probably is the most careful analysis which has been prepared to date - apart, of course, from estimates which presumably are being made by the Army and the Navy.

August 21, 1942

Recommended New Method of Bombing Attacks Against Germany

Memorandum by

Dr. Karl Brandt
(Economist, Food Research Institute, Stanford University)I. The Weakest Spot in Germany's Economic Armor

Analysts of Germany's power of economic resistance have frequently made the assumption that the German food supplies and the supplies of motor fuel and lubricants are the weakest bastions in her fortress. According to all information available at present, it is exceedingly doubtful whether there is much or any truth in such assumptions.

On the one hand, there is considerable evidence that Germany's war economy is most vulnerable and already has had to stand the greatest strain in its system of transportation, which consists essentially of railroads for the long haul and the bulk goods with waterways and highways as inferior supplementary resources. Railroads are the chief means of transport, much more so than in the United States or Great Britain, because they use coal as fuel which is abundant. Waterways are inferior because of the long period of frost and the slowness of shipping. Highway transport is suffering from a scarcity of trucks, rubber, and fuel. The German railroads with their services today extend over a large part of the European continent. It is highly probable that disturbances or temporary paralysis of certain parts of the heavily burdened arterial system would yield a many times greater loss of man hours in industry and raw materials than that which can be laid idle by direct attack upon factories or other targets.

Due to the tremendous industrial war boom, great shifts have occurred in Germany in the requirements of food and fuel of the big cities. A much larger proportion of the people are employed today in the main industrial centers and have been taken away from the farms. Hence, larger freight services for provisioning the urban population and supplies of household fuel are essential. The war at the distant Russian front requires a constant flow of war materials by rail from the Reich, which in turn imposes a heavier burden on the trackage, rolling stock, and personnel. The statements of German officials reported in German newspapers and the comments of reliable foreign observers in France, Switzerland, and Sweden indicate that during the fall season of 1941 and still more so in the spring of 1942, the German railroads were not able to fulfill in time the exceedingly heavy assignments of service for shipments of bulk food, industrial materials, and arms and ammunition to the front. In the spring of 1942, it was seriously discussed in German newspapers that the Reich Ministry of Food would make an effort to shift a large part of the potato acreage from its present location into the immediate proximity of the main consumption centers, especially the Rhineland and the Ruhr Valley, in order to avoid the lack of supplies for many weeks. Potato culture fits, however, much better into the pattern of farming in Eastern

Germany than it does in the west, but it is obviously impossible to move in addition to the congestion of other urgent shipments many million tons of potatoes in the short period between the harvesting season in September and October and the first killing frost, which frequently comes in the second part of October or earlier.

III. The Suggested Imitation of a Blizzard

According to the experience of leading German railroad officials, as for instance, Dr. Ludwig Homberger (up to 1938 vice-president of the German Reich Railroad Corporation, now professor at the American University, Washington, D. C.), the worst upheaval in the railroad service observed for over more than 20 years has been caused twice by blizzards, which fell over large parts of Germany. Heavy snows and the alternation of soft temperatures and hardest frost blocked the switches, caused derailments and endless delays, and hampered the necessary food supplies for the cities for weeks. The greatest efforts made were frustrated by the simultaneous effect of the weather upon all the trackage in the respective areas.

Most of the bombing that has been applied to Germany by the RAF has, according to my knowledge, either tried to hit military targets in the industrial areas or ports or fortifications directly or, in so far as the transportation system was the object of bombing raids, the bombs were aimed at freight yards, switches, bridges, or main terminals. Usually such attacks were made in long intervals; frequently targets were hit squarely; but according to all reports even big holes in the railroad bridges over the Rhine have been repaired in two days or less.

It is suggested that a new method ought to be tried; namely, a method imitating the effects of a blizzard, namely simultaneous blanketing of a whole area by bombing all the feeder lines of rails plus highways with a steady repetition in such intervals that complete repair is made impossible for several weeks.

III. The Timing

Railroad systems in industrialized countries have a load curve for freight ton-mileage which shows a high seasonal variation similar to that of the labor load in agriculture. The peak load for urgent freight shipping is condensed into a period of from 8-10 weeks in the fall, covering the months of late August, September, October, and early November, and in spring covering the period of late February, March, April, and early May. The fall peak is higher than the one in spring. This peak is the result of heavy shipments of grain, sugar beets, especially potatoes, fertilizer, and seed grain, and of building materials and household winter supplies. In this war, the fall peak is accentuated by the heavy requirements of the army at the Russian front, which must be provided with stockpiles for winter quarters and other materials, the shipment of which is jeopardized during the frost and snow season. At the same front shipments of potatoes and fertilizer are the most urgent ones, because potatoes must be shipped before the heavy frost sets in. Fertilizer is needed also before frost and snow begin in order to get the fall-sown crops in good condition into the winter season.

It is obvious that bombing attacks will have a much more telling effect if they take place in peak-load periods - preferably in fall.

The fall season is particularly advantageous from another angle. All over Germany, as over the northwestern part of the European continent, the period called in the United States 'Indian Summer' is normally favored with the most ideal weather - bright sunshine, cumulous clouds, starlit nights, that hold especially during the latter part of August or September and often the first two weeks of October. During that period, I know, from my own observation while using the airlines in Germany, that at night the rails are visible to such an extent that the pilots of commercial airlines use them for orientation at night.

IV. Suggested Method of Attack

It is suggested that for paralysing communications a whole industrial area (i.e., - the Essen, Cologne, Düsseldorf district or the Hanover district) should be mapped out for continuous attack, stretching over a period of four to five successive weeks. Instead of flying into the center of the district, the bombing planes should attack in dispersion and, if possible, follow up all the main railroad tracks leading to the area, trunk as well as branch lines, and parallel highways. The planes should fly at treetop level and drop bombs at short intervals on the tracks, in order to crack the rails and pry craters into the road bed at as many consecutive spots as possible up to the main receiving centers. It is assumed that modern bombing technique permits the use of an appropriate type of delayed-action bombs and their accurate placement on the right of way, so that real damage can be done. If in addition, bridges, switch-control stations, locomotive sheds and other installations can be damaged, the freezing of the freight arteries would be complete.

V. The Advantages of the Suggested Method

If it is possible to damage the tracks of a dozen or more of the main lines over long stretches with bombs dropped in a pearl-string pattern, it will take much more time to do the necessary repair work. So far with single bomb hits on the tracks repair crews have been moving by emergency trains to the damaged spot. This procedure would become impossible if 20 miles of tracks were blocked by 50 or 40 different bomb craters.

The central bomber assault upon the military targets have resulted in a concentration of anti-aircraft defenses around the factories in the heart of the industrial area. It is very doubtful whether much defense artillery or heavy machine guns are placed along the tracks. Shifting to a new pattern of attack may catch the defense forces by surprise. Until they have been readjusted, the main resistance would consist of interceptor planes.

I am unable to judge the military feasibility of this type of attack. As an economist I want to point out that a temporary paralyzation of the railroad communications of an industrial area during the critical peak-load season

would probably affect the enemy's output of war industries, the food supplies of the urban population, and the morale, more seriously than the direct attack upon factories or upon isolated spots in the railroad system. If it can be prevented that the eastern potato supplies for the winter reach the Ruhr valley district in time before hard frost strikes, the shortage will be felt all winter long. If the movements of coal from the Ruhr to the central and southern provinces and to Italy are upset in Feb: again the shortage will be felt for many months.

ONE THIRTY-FIVE EAST FORTY-SECOND STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y.

Oct 5th, 1942
4 1942
October 5th., 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

The attached is a memorandum
covering conditions in France which I have
just received from one of my French associates
and I am passing it on to you as I feel its
contents should be of interest to some of your
services.

Hastily yours,

W.M.B.

William M. Brewster.

MEMORANDUM
ON THE SITUATION IN FRANCE
AS OF JUNE 30th, 1942

If the change in the situation in France during the first six months of 1942 could be summarized, it should be described as a new step towards economic debasement following a specially severe winter and heavier and heavier consequences of the war.

It can now be verified that the 1941 crop, which was expected much more better, was in fact inferior by 25% of the 1939 crop as far as wheat is concerned, 15% for potatoes and about 30% for wine.

If after such a crop it was made possible not to stop the bread distribution, it is due to the exaggerated softening of the flour, and to a small importation from Algeria which saved a situation that appeared in June as being alarming.

Some comparisons of rationing between France and other countries are given below : (normal weekly rationing)

	France	England	Germany	Switzerland
Meat	180 grs (1)	375 grs (2)	400 grs (3)	550 grs
Fats & Oils	103 "	311 "	269 " (4)	195 "
Sugar	115 "	373 "	280 " (5)	138 "
Bread	275 " per day	free	322 "	free up to recent time
Potatoes	3 kgs 360 per month	free up to March 1942	unknown but superior to French rationing.	free up to recent time

Milk In France, the common user is not entitled to integral milk. Skim-milk is scarce.

These figures of official rationing are those applied in cities but are increased in the country by consumption of farm products.

As a consequence of this lack of supplies in the towns, an increase in the coverage of vegetable gardens has been noticed.

(1) - In fact, in first week of July, it was only 150 grs. To this ration, a supplement of 50 grs was granted for the youths.
 (2) - including meat, bacon and ham.
 (3) - to April 5th 1942 - Since April 5th : 400 grs.
 (4) - reduced to 200 grs on April 5th.
 (5) - reduced on April 5th to an unknown figure.

- 2 -

The result is to be probably a small improvement of the 1942 crop. But for the bulk of the large French crop, the reduction of the sow spaces due to lack of seeds, the decline in the number and strength of workmanship, the lack of fertilizers, the scarcity of transport and fuel, will conduct in 1942-43 to a further reduction of products. The prospects of the food production from agriculture remain dark if war is to last some time more.

As it was previously reported, the index for industrial production was in January reduced to 50% of the June 1939 figure. It has not improved since. But indexes are based on big concerns only. Such big concerns have suffered from lack of coal, reduction of hydroelectric production due to exceptional dryness, scarcity of raw material and paralysis of the transactions.

Aside from the big concerns, the private home work developed, same being easier to supply with raw material and being nearer to the customers. French industry is returning to what it was in 1860.

The remaining activity is not entirely used for the benefit of France. Half of it only, that is to say one quarter of the 1939 activity, corresponds to French purpose (mainly up-keeping, repairs and recuperation work).

Moreover, the above index is not taking into account the lowering of the industrial production due to the technical regression, unsufficient up-keeping of the machinery and the present psychological, moral and food conditions; this additional lowering can be estimated from 20 to 25%. Such degradation is bound to increase during the fall and chiefly during next winter if no important fact occurs.

Fuel and lubricating stocks have constantly reduced. Imports are practically null.

The following figures may give an idea of the dearth of transport

TABLE 2

Fuel consumption in France :

	<u>1937</u>	<u>1942</u>
Gasoline (tons)	2,500,000	65,000
Alcohol "	200,000	60,000
Benzol "	75,000	20,000
Gas Oil "	230,000	60,000
Fuel Oil "	500,000	Nil
Solid Fuels "	25,000	100,000
		(Charcoal 450,000
		(Pitcoal 100,000
		(Compressed gas 36,000,000 cubic meters for 6 to 8,000 cars.

- 3 -

The number of cars on service should also be compared :

	<u>1937</u>	<u>1942</u>
Motor cars	1,708,000	Authorized cars including gazogene cars (1)
Trucks	427,000	Trucks and ship motors
Gazogene cars	2,000	Electric cars

(1) - reduced every day or stopped from running.

•
•

Unemployment was further reduced during the first months of 1942. More men are being required to do the same work, and also the demand for men to work in Germany increased. The number of French workers in Germany was 150,000 a few months ago. It dropped to around 120,000 on account of returns which were not followed by re-departures.

Newspapers printed in the Occupied Zone state that presently the number of French workers in Germany is 170,000; the difference is perhaps made of prisoners of war working on the spot. The Germans are asking for 350,000 more workers. People have no enthusiasm to enlist voluntarily, in spite of the promise that has been made to give back in exchange a certain number of prisoners of war, mostly peasants.

•
•

Index of loaded freight cars on the Railroads has been :

	1913	100
Average	1929	134
Average	1939	83
June	1939	91
April	1940	90
August	1940	37
December	1940	64
November	1941	72
January	1942	54
March	1942	59

This continuous reduction, during the last period, is undoubtedly the result of the lack of freight cars more than of the lack of goods to be transported. The Germans have taken 200,000 freight cars at the time of the Armistice, 45,000 since then; not taking into account last freight cars which are returning very slowly, and a new request for 40,000 freight cars.

- 4 -

cars and 1,200 engines has been recently presented. France is giving more and more to a railroad transport basis.

Hereafter are given a few figures on wholesale and retail prices, as well as on the cost of living:

(Basis index 100 in August 1939)

		<u>Wholesale prices</u>	<u>Retail prices</u>	<u>Cost of living</u>
1939	August	100	100	100
	December	128	109.3	110.5
1940	June	157.3	110.4	118.5
	December	161.8	132.4	130.1
1941	June	172.9	143.4	142.0
	December	196.0	150.9	150.1
1942	March	198.9	153.6	153.4
	May (estimated)	200.3	155.00	154.4

The above figures are based on the official taxed prices. To arrive at a true statistical figure, the off market sales should be taken into consideration, while such transactions are not so important as it is generally believed.

The activity of the Stock Exchange has shown a new important rise. Since January 1942, index went up from 800 to over 1,000 (that is to say an advance of 20-25%), maintaining itself however between 1,000 and 1,100 (see exhibit).

This rise is due to speculation on inflation, or at least to the desire of investing, by all means, all the available cash furnished by an extensive printing of banknotes.

FINANCIAL SITUATION.

Tax returns are coming in within a reasonable rhythm; taxpayers are now compelled to pay their taxes, by advance quarter instalments, even before receiving their tax statements. But the amounts thus collected are far from covering the expenses. It has then become necessary for the Treasury to draw resources from other means, i.e.:

- 5 -

Banknotes,
 Treasury Bonds
 Government Bonds,
 "Banque de France"'s credits.

The Banknotes into circulation were 170 billions at the end of December 1941 and 300 billions at the end of June 1942, i.e. an increase of 30 billions. The rythm of increase has had an upward tendency since one year. To the contrary, the rythm of increase on the Bank deposits is slower. The difference between the two is explained by the considerable amount of bank notes kept by private holders, mainly in the country, where difficulties of transport and communications with banks are great, the increase of prices obliging the holders to keep their reserves at home, this not taking into account the "woollen stockings" which are over full due to the fact that it is almost impossible to invest money neither in estates or securities.

These considerable amounts were used until recently for buying Treasury Bonds. The amount of issued Treasury Bonds was about 220 billions at the end of 1941. It is now about 300 billions. Banks have used them to invest a large part of their available cash. They also have given all facilities to big firms which are overflowed with cash. Such firms usually invest their cash in Treasury Bonds at six months, at one year and even at two years. As these companies are only looking for temporary investments, and as they may need immediate liquidity, banks have made easy for them discount and re-discount of bonds; they have also bound themselves to take back, in case of need, the bonds at the issuing rate, on very short notice: 24 hours. The danger can be seen in case of credit restrain: there will be an afflux of bonds on the banks and on the Banque de France. The Banque de France has therefore decided to more or less shut up the open market, the right to discount securities at less than ninety days remaining as in the past. The result of this measure is bound to bring about a serious reduction in the Treasury Bond subscriptions.

In order to reach another category of lenders, the Finance Minister issued a new type of Bonds called "Bonds d'Espargne", at four years maturity, bearing an interest of 3%. These bonds did not meet with favor, a higher yield being obtainable from other bonds.

The issuance of long term Government Bonds is impossible for the time being. The Government foresees, however, for the end of the year, the issuance of a loan bearing on 20 to 25 billions to buy back Treasury Bonds, or consolidate already existing bonds, or reimburse part of the overdraft with the Banque de France. Will this operation be a success, nobody can tell at the present time, but it seems reasonable.

The Government is presently converting two of its loans, namely the 4 1/2% Outilage National, and the 5% 1932, in a long term loan at 3 1/2% per annum. This is only a small operation, total of which is not exceeding 20 billions. It is discussed in financial circles. However, the Minister for Finances is preparing for the Fall another conversion - more important - of the 4 1/2% 1932 loan (A & B), totaling around 100 billions. Those conversions seem to be a very weak remedy to the situation. It is to the monetary position itself that a remedy should be found.

- 6 -

The Bank of France is mostly called upon by the Government to make up its Treasury.

Advances to the State, for payment of the Occupation indemnity, increased from : 142 billions end of 1941, to 171 billions in June 1942

(i.e. an increase of 29 billions in five months), which added to the advances, without interest, are making a grand total of advances of 279 billions.

On the other hand, the current account opened by the Bank of France to the Reichkreditkassen, in which account are deposited every day 500 million francs representing the daily occupation indemnity, i.e. 9 billions monthly, shows that its balance, which was of 64 1/2 billions end of 1941, has been reduced to 54 billions in June 1942. That is to say that the Germans have drawn from their account since the beginning of the year 10 billions which were thrown into the circulation, at the same time as the 9 billions monthly, since six months, making a total of :

54 billions, plus
10 billions

which were absorbed by the circulation.

Bank notes into circulation (increased from 270 to 300 billions, i.e. 30 billions) are not necessarily a duplication in totality of these 64 billions.

Money is still cheap at 1.75% at three months and 3/8% at sight.

The demographical situation has not improved.

The birth and death statistic up to March show the following trend:

The births are increasing, but they are still below those of the 1932/1938 period, and more numerous in Non Occupied Zone than in Occupied Zone.

The deaths have been important in January, less in February and March. Their number is, on the whole, approximately 30% higher than the average before the war. It is higher in the Occupied Zone and especially in Paris, than in the Non Occupied Zone. The percentage of death of elderly people is still very high.

2013/09/17 214

SECRET~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: David Bruce

DATE: October 16, 1942

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT:

The following report was received from Lagos, Nigeria, under date of September 25, 1942, which our African desk grades as "Z, A-1":

"General Fitzgerald (USCO West African theater) at Accra stated on September 20th that he is making efforts to remove the OWI men stationed in his territory on the West Coast (at Brazzaville and Lagos.) This was brought to a head recently when Fitzgerald received a harsh raspberry from headquarters in Washington because George Bookman, the OWI man in Brazzaville, has sent a long cable in clear to the effect that our troops had landed in Leopoldville, giving details. Fitzgerald said that he knows nothing about these curious OWI men wandering about in his territory, doing these things without his authority which might easily place him in an embarrassing or even dangerous position. He flew down to Lagos and gave Bookman hell, but is far from satisfied with the situation."

Q. B.
D. B.**SECRET**
~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



In reply refer to
FA 102.91802/881

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

x Sloane, Albert
 x Rousseau, Raymond
 x Blum, Robert
 State Dept.
 x London Office

January 25, 1943

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Director of the Office of Strategic Services and acknowledges the receipt of four letters of December 7, 1942 concerning the assignments to London of Messrs. Albert J. Sloane, Crane C. Brinton, Raymond Rousseau and Robert Blum.

The Department of State is pleased to advise that these assignments have been approved and that appropriate instructions have been issued to the American Embassy at London. There is enclosed in this connection a copy of the Department's telegram no. 182 of January 8, 1943 to the Embassy at London.

Enclosure:

To Embassy, London, no. 182,
January 8, 1943.

Copies of letter to
Telegrams to:

{ Barnes
 { Opsata
 Alconn

1/26

1/26



TOP ↑

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION
BUREAU FA

ENCLOSURE

Out

TO

Car

LETTER DRAFTED

green

the

ADDRESSED TO

1985 of

Director of the Office of
Strategic Services

Evening

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

TELEGRAM SET

PLAIN

DWR

January 6, 1943

EMBASSY,

LONDON.

182, Eighth
 Office of Strategic Services is sending following additional personnel to London:

Grant C. Brinton	Assistant Director of London Research and Analysis Branch.
Albert J. Sloane	Assistant Photographer.
Raymond Rousseau	Senior Photographer
Robert Blum	Research Analyst

It is understood Brinton has already arrived at London. Blum expected to arrive about January 10. Sloane and Rousseau about January 12.

You are authorized to make following payments to these men:

1. Per diem at \$6.00 within and \$7.00 outside continental limits of the United States, except that only \$6.00 allowed for travel aboard ship where meals are furnished as part of cost of transportation. At expiration of 60 days after arrival at port, per diem should be reduced to \$4.00.
2. For Brinton and Blum part payment of salary at

-2-, #182, January 6, to London.

at \$151.23 and \$75. month, respectively, without retirement deductions. Balance of these salaries to be paid by O.S.S. in U.S. Entire salaries of Sloane and Rousseau to be paid by O.S.S. in U.S.

All payments should be taken up in Embassy's accounts accordance Section V-45, for reimbursement by O.S.S. accordance authorization contained in four letters of December 7, 1942. All vouchers should be certified by an authorized certifying officer of O.S.S.

HULL
(GHS)

FA:RIP:CLN:SS SU DM A-S/3

8823
SAC, FBI, D.C.
12/7/42

December 7, 1942

The Honorable
G. Howard Shaw
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Shaw:

This office desires to dispatch Mr. Crane C. Brinton to London, England, as Assistant Director of the London Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services. Mr. Brinton should arrive in London, England, on or about December 11, 1942.

It is desired to have \$161.23 of Mr. Brinton's salary made available to him through the facilities of the American Embassy in London, England. The remainder of his official salary including retirement deductions, board allotments, etc., will be paid by this office in Washington, D. C. It is also desired that payments be made in London, England, to Mr. Brinton for his per diem allowances and travel expenses. Mr. Brinton will be allowed \$4.00 per diem while traveling within the continental limits of the United States and \$7.00 while traveling outside the continental limits of the United States except only \$5.00 will be allowed while aboard ship where meals are furnished as a part of the cost of transportation. At the expiration of sixty days after arrival at his temporary post of duty London, England, the per diem allowance will be reduced to \$4.00.

It will be appreciated if the Department of State will make the necessary arrangements with the officials of the American Embassy in London, England, to have the necessary salary payments and reimbursements for per diem allowances and travel expenses made to Mr. Brinton effective December 1, 1942 as outlined above. Vouchers covering these payments may be honored when certified by our authorized certifying officer in London. The Office of Strategic Services will reimburse the Department of State for all payments made on behalf of Mr. Brinton on vouchers and adjustments, Standard Form 2000, in accordance with existing procedures.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

cc: Colonel Donovan ✓
Mr. Edwards
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gandy
Mr. Fisher Howe
Mr. Woodring

Brooker 969

December 27, 1942

Lt. Colonel R. M. Brooker
Toronto, Canada

Dear Colonel Brooker:

I was delighted to receive your letter of December 18. As you say, practically a year has gone by during which this organization has had the benefit of your advice and cooperation which I assure you has been deeply appreciated.

I am convinced that our training program, due in large measure to your inspiration and guidance, has made rapid strides and am confident that it will show most satisfactory results.

I am glad to know that you share my enthusiasm and that the program as a whole meets with your approval.

It is my hope that our association may continue not only for its already proven worth but for your aid in the problems of both war and peace which lie ahead.

With most cordial season's greetings in which our staff joins me,

Very sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

R. Davis Halliwell

TOP ↑

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

4003

DATE:

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Huntington
From: Colonel Donovan
Subject:

Will you please prepare a reply to the attached
for my signature.

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

46053

- 2 -

strength with a single dud included. I have played a very small part in all this and the present advanced stage of the Training is entirely due to the keenness, hard work and team spirit displayed by all the Members of the Training Staff.

In closing I should like to wish you and all your Staff a Merry Christmas and really big things in the New Year.

Yours very sincerely

R. L. Rutherford
Lt Col.

Brooker

Colonel W. J. Donovan,
Temporary "Q" Building,
Constitution Avenue,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
U.S.A.

*Boettcher 10/21
X 10023200000*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
United States of America

(f)
American Embassy
London

December 2, 1942

TO: Mr. George Bowden
FROM: George O. Pratt

From a leader of the Belgian illegal trade union movement who was in Belgium from June 1490 to July 1942, and arrived in London about November 1, I received information that the bombing of transport facilities by American and British air force units had not been as effective as it might be because the targets selected were not the principal or most important ones. For example, attempts would be made to bomb a single train or to bomb switch yards or bridges. The bombing of a single train, even though it might cause a wreck, was ineffective because traffic might easily be re-routed. The bombing of switch yards was similarly ineffective because the number of switching points throughout Belgium made it comparatively easy to re-route transport with a minimum of interruption. As far as the bombing of bridges was concerned, the targets were difficult to hit squarely and were thus put out of action, if at all, only for a short time.

The suggestion was made that if the targets would consist of the locomotive round houses, central repair shops and classification yards, there would be a much greater effect upon the transport facilities in Belgium.

Pursuant to this suggestion, I have requested that my informant prepare for me a brief summary of the location and probable condition of these three types of places, and the attached report has been given to me in response to my request. You will note that the report refers to three types of places, first, the bridges and viaducts, which, as I pointed out above, are very difficult to destroy. You will note also that he

-2-

points out that these bridges are situated in congested areas, and I suppose that one thing to be borne in mind in selecting a target is to select one that would cause damage without destroying the houses or lives of a number of people who live immediately adjacent to the target. You will note, however, he does name three bridges, the destruction of which would block traffic from and to Germany. These are situated near Liege and Namur. My informant then lists fifteen places where round houses are located which he considers the most important of the country, and although as he says, the Germans do not make a practice of leaving their locomotives in the round houses, he indicates that in winter it is difficult not to bring them in for at least a period every twenty-four hours, and that generally speaking, the time between 1 A.M. and 3 A.M. will find the greatest number of locomotives in these round houses.

Two central repair shops are named, the destruction of which would have an obvious and serious effect upon transport in Belgium.

He also lists eleven places where the most important classification yards are located, and in talking with me about these classification yards he indicated that trains are made up in such yards in the normal fashion, and that these yards were not, in July, protected to any great extent by anti-aircraft batteries.

While I suppose that both our air force and the British air force command have excellent bombing target maps, and while I suppose that they made elaborate plans for bombing attacks, it is my thought that this information coming as it does not only from a completely trustworthy Belgian source, but from a person who himself was on the Board of Directors of the Belgian national railways, may have some weight in the determination of the targets at which we should aim. As my informant put it, it may be more sport to try to bomb a moving train, but the amount of destruction to be accomplished would be much greater if we would undertake to bomb the engines and their round houses, and the freight cars lined up on parallel tracks in classification yards.

GEORGE O. PRATT

Attachment

Personals. 9612

46333

(1)
Personals
46333PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

December 18th, 1942.

Dear Colonel Donovan,

It is now practically a year since I first had the privilege of making contact with your Organisation. During this year we have had at this School members of your Staff undergoing training with us. On behalf of my Instructors and myself I want to say what a wonderful year it has been for us to have had this chance of working together with your people. We have learned a lot from them and have been fortunate in making so many very good and lasting friendships. I do not think any better example could be shown than during our joint Courses here that American and British people can work together, endure the same hardships, make lasting friendships and face the future with the same ideals.

For my part it has been a great privilege to me to go a stage further and to have been given the opportunity of helping in the Organising of your own Training Schools. As I reported to you the other day these Schools are now on what I feel is a first-class basis and I have every confidence that with the present Staff of Instructors and personnel in the Training Department that in the course of another month or two, we shall have a training setup which will compare favourably with anything of its kind in the world. It has taken a little time to organise because from the first we have been very "choosey" as to the Staff - particularly of instructors - and have felt it better to be under-staffed with the right people than up to

- 1 -

Rec'd by R. L. C. 1/26/42

204
Tr. Secy.
7/26

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 25, 1942

Personal and
Confidential

Dear Bill:


The Irish Minister, Mr. Brennan, came to see me yesterday.

In the course of our conversation he referred to rumors which had reached him that your office and O.F.F. were preparing propaganda for use with the Irish people if the American troops in Northern Ireland undertook to invade Eire. I had already told the Minister that our troops were stationed in Northern Ireland in the interest of our own security - which would be that of Ireland - and not for purposes of aggression. I told him I had heard no such rumors such as had come to him.

He then asked if I had any objection to his calling upon you and talking with you. I said I had none whatever and that I was sure you would be glad to see him. I am, consequently, sending you these lines of explanation so that ... and when he asks to come to see you, you may know what is in the background.

Believe me

Very sincerely yours,



The Honorable
William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

BUCKLEY 40-6

0126-1
AN-114-ac

18 February, 1942.

From: The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.
To: Lieutenant Colonel William W. Buckley, Marine Corps.
Retired, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
Via: The Commandant.
Subject: Change of station.

1. You are hereby detached from your present station and duties, and will report to The Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, for duty as the relief of Colonel Joseph T. Smith, Marine Corps.

T. HOLCOMB

Copy to The Chief of Naval Operations,
Director of Naval Intelligence,
The Quartermaster,
The Paymaster - 3,
Lt. Col. Buckley - 10.

Muster roll cix no.

00/BUCKLEY, W.W. 1st Endorsement 20 February 1942

From: Commandant, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
To: Lieut. Colonel Wm. W. Buckley, Marine Corps,
Retired, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

1. Detached.

2. No public quarters were available nor were any assigned you while on duty at this Yard.

Geo. Pettengill

W.F. Loenthal
By direction

COPY

0126-1
AN-114-acHEADQUARTERS U.S. MARINE CORPS
Washington

18 February, 1942.

From: The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.
 To: Lieutenant Colonel William W. Buckley, Marine Corps,
 Retired, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
 Via: The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.
 Subject: Charge of station.

1. I am hereby detached from your present station and duties, and will report to the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, for duty as the relief of Colonel Joseph T. Smith, Marine Corps.

/s/ T. Holcomb

Copy to the Chief of Naval Operations,
 Director of Naval Intelligence,
 Comptroller,
 Master - 3,
 Col. Buckley - 10.

cc: [redacted], W. W. 1st Endorsement 20 February 1942

Commandant, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
 Lieut. Colonel William W. Buckley, Marine Corps,
 Retired, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

1. Detached.
 2. No public quarters were available nor were any assigned you while on duty at this Yard.

GEO. PETTENGILL
 /s/ W. F. Loenthal
 By direction

2nd Endorsement Navy Yard, Washington, D. C.

Received at 3:30 p.m. 20 February 1942.

/s/ WILLIAM W. BUCKLEY
 LtCol., U.S.M.C., Ret'd.

Op-10-E/JG

3rd Endorsement
 Washington, D.C.
 February 21, 1942.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
 To: Lieut. Colonel William W. Buckley, Marine Corps.

1. Reported this date.

/s/ G. G. MORRISON
 By direction.

*13107 branch 464
x Hospital Branch*

EDWARD G. BURGHARD
ROUTE 3, BOX 728
WATSONVILLE, CALIFORNIA

March 6, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Administration Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill,

I just received a letter from the office of the Surgeon General
stating that at the present time there is no known indication for the need
of an additional army hospital in this locality.

A thousand thanks for your prompt effort.

Sincerely,

Ed
Edward G. Burghard

EDG/b

COPY

Coordinator of Information

4th Endorsement
Washington, D. C.
February 21, 1942

From: Coordinator of Information.
To: The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.

Subject: Reported for duty.

1. Reported for duty February 21, 1942, 1330.

/s/ William J. Donovan

1/2/42
T. E.



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
WASHINGTON

File

February 18, 1942

Dear Bill:

I have your note of February 15, enclosing copy of a letter you received from Mr. Edward G. Burghard. I will see that the offer of his home site for hospital purposes is brought to the attention of the Surgeon General.

Sincerely,

Jack

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Administration Building
Washington, D. C.

Burgland 4645
x Hospital Plane

February 15, 1942

The Honorable John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jack:

Here is a letter from a
very reputable fellow. I don't know
whether you would be interested or
not.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

MacL.
Donovan:Foy

Burghard, Edward
44-1101 Case 1045.

EDWARD G. BURGHARD
ROUTE 3, BOX 728
WATSONVILLE, CALIFORNIA

Febr. 8, 1942.

Dear Bill:

We have recently heard that both the Army and Navy are considering establishing hospital bases out here, and that sites suitable for this purpose are already being investigated.

Up to now we had not seriously thought of disposing of our property here, but upon hearing of the above, thought what an ideal spot this place would be for hospital purposes.

You see, we have a little over 95 acres, situated right on the Bay of Monterey, with woods and private beach. Our house is large enough, and so laid out, that it could immediately be used as an Administration building, and other buildings placed around or near it. If necessary, it could even be used as a temporary hospital, while any other building operations were going on.

The property is on the main road leading to Camp McQuaide which, by the way, is only a few miles away. A new State Highway is only about 3/4 of a mile from us, and a spur line of the Southern Pacific Railroad runs right through one end of the property. So you see, transportation facilities are ideal.

From a health standpoint I doubt whether a better place could be found. All our guests and friends visiting us call it the Sanitarium, because of the recuperative climate. We also have excellent water, with plenty of it.

We originally expected my mother to spend quite some time with us, and as she would have numerous friends visit her, besides other members of our family, we built a rather large house. As usual, things did not work out as we expected, so that the house is really too large for just the two of us. It would be much better for us to have a smaller place, especially during these times, when all our efforts must be put to winning the war.

I have made some inquiries as to whom to see, but find that the only thing to do is to go right to headquarters. In the case of the Army that would be General De Witt, but I do not know who is in command of the Navy out here.

Not knowing General De Witt or the commanding officer of the Navy, I was wondering whether you would care to send me

Mr. F. C. T.

February 15, 1942

Mr. Edward G. Burghard
Route 3, Box 725
Watsonville, California

Dear Ed:

I have your letter. I know
nothing about this but I am sending it
on to Jack McCloy.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Donovan:Foy


II.
EDWARD G. BURGHARD
ROUTE 3, BOX 728
WATSONVILLE, CALIFORNIA

letters of introduction to these officers, or to anyone else in authority. You may know of other channels to contact, and any suggestion or help you could give us certainly would be appreciated. As I said before, we feel that this place would be ideal for a hospital, or a place for convalescents, and would therefore like to have the opportunity of offering it for sale to the proper authorities. Perhaps you could look it over yourself for Col. Knox. We certainly would like to see you.

Well, Bill, many thanks in advance for anything you can do in this matter. Do give our best to Russ and Jo when you see them.

With kindest regards from us both -- lots of good luck!

Sincerely,



Brisson 3816
 X Kleinpeter
 Paynter

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
 OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 27, 1942

Mr. James Murphy
 Assistant to the Coordinator
 Office of Coordinator of Information
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Murphy:

The following information comes from Mr. Hubert Kleinpeter, friend of Frederick Brisson. Frederick Brisson is the husband of Rosalind Russell, the movie actress who has been invited to attend the President's Birthday Ball here in Washington, and also the son of Carl Brisson, very well known in the United Kingdom and throughout the Scandinavian countries as an actor.

Frederick Brisson has been in radio work for a number of years and manages the radio work of Herbert Marshall, Leslie Howard, Cary Grant, and others. He worked on a London newspaper and was correspondent for the Hollywood Reporter. He also organized the U.S.O. program in connection with the Hollywood Bowl.

Mr. Brisson speaks seven languages fluently and is anxious to get connected with the Office of Coordinator of Information ruling counter propaganda work.

Mr. Brisson was highly recommended by James D. Secrest, who is in charge of our regional service.

Sincerely yours,

Henry Paynter
 Henry M. Paynter
 Chief, Economics Branch

Memorandum: To Colonel William Donovan
From Pearl S. Buck

It is already known that Japan is making much use in her propaganda in Asia of the prejudice of white people against peoples of color. What is not so well known is the effect which this propaganda is beginning to have. The strength in Japan's propaganda is the unfortunate fact that it is true that many white people do have a strong prejudice against people of color, and that there have been many white persons in China, Japan, Malaya, The Philippines, and India - indeed, in every part where Japan is now using this propaganda, who have been overbearing, arrogant and unjust in the treatment of citizens of those countries. Propaganda strengthens such memory. The Japanese propaganda says, "The white people will never give you equality because they have never granted equality to any colored race. When you fight at the side of white men you are fighting for their rule over you." Japan cites as arguments:

- a. England's continued unwillingness to grant even dominion status to India.
- b. England's colonial attitude toward all colored subjects.
- c. The discrimination which United States has always had toward colored Americans.
- d. The fact that the U. S. navy will not allow colored members except in menial positions,

-2-

that no colored men are yet in the U. S. airforce, and that in the army colored and white are segregated.

Proofs of the effect of this propaganda are to be found among our allies, especially among the younger people. All are seriously troubled by what might be a victorious white imperialism more difficult for them to overthrow in the long run even than Japanese rule. One hears such remarks as this, always spoken in confidential circles,

"We had better not allow the Japanese navy to be destroyed - we may need it against the whites."

"Even though I hate the Japanese, yet if we had to choose between being a dependency of the Japanese or of the Americans, we would choose the Japanese because they have no race prejudice to be a bar to the hope of future equality."

"After all, what proof have the English and Americans given us of their real belief in democracy? They are not fighting for democracy but for themselves. We must fight for ourselves."

"Had we better not keep the strength of Japan, which is the only modern nation in Asia, to fight the white modern nations if we must? If we destroy Japan, what will we do if the white people do not give us the democracy we want?"

Such remarks, and there are many of them, show a disturbed state of mind which has been increased by the following recent events:

1. Churchill's visit to Washington, which the people of Asia interpret as an endeavor to

ce ment union between England and the
United States alone.

2. The "Union Now" movement itself, which excludes except in vague terms the democracy of China from the proposed federation of democracies.
3. ~~Our allies in Asia have further been the~~
~~treated by~~ tendency in such important officials as General Wavell to be colonial-minded even toward such leaders as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. An example quoted was that when Wavell in an interview expressed his thanks to the allies for giving him his command, he omitted mention of China though China has been carrying on the main war against Japan for so long in Asia.
4. It is felt that in Washington, Churchill showed a lack of knowledge of affairs and persons among our allies in Asia and that his interest was not sufficient to help him to know or remember them when told.
5. The end of Churchill's speech when he spoke of England and the United States "walking side by side in majesty" etc. (his first public speech in Washington, see closing lines) was taken as confirmation of his "Atlantic-mindedness," by people thinking from the viewpoint of Asia.
6. A tendency of ^{American} newspaper reporters and columnists

-4-

to lump the peoples of Asia together under the term "Yellow" or "Oriental." The Chinese especially very strongly object to this, and feel that as they never speak of "white" or "Occidentals," but always of nations, the peoples of Asia deserve also to be spoken of as nations and not by color or by "Orientals." A very sharp reference was made to this by an important Chinese official when he had just seen the Washington Times-Herald use the terms "those Orientals" a few days ago.

7. It must be taken into account also that it is inevitable that our severe losses in the Far East have produced a conscious or unconscious rise of surprised feeling among all those who have suffered in some measure from white imperialism in the past. The prestige of the white man in the Far East, until this time based largely on the power of arms, has declined temporarily at least out of proportion to the truth. There is pride even among our allies that an Asian people ^{has} ~~have~~ been able so to deal with a strong western power. Japan is quick to turn this to racial account. She is saying, "You see we need not be afraid of the white man."
8. India remains a test case for democracy in Asia. Much depends on the reply given by England

-5-

through Churchill to the recent request made by fifteen of the leaders of India, all of whom were moderates in politics. England has a bad record in the minds of Far Eastern peoples, including China. Japan will undoubtedly gain greatly if England continues her present uncompromising attitude toward India.

These are the chief facts which are at this moment aiding Japan in her dangerously successful propaganda in Asia, among all peoples.

What can we do to counteract this propaganda?

~~Actions and considerations that are most important~~

1. We must act for ourselves first, and remember that we have a relation to Asia which is not England's. We face the Pacific as well as the Atlantic. We have not England's dark record in the Far East and we must not now take it upon ourselves by allying ourselves so completely with England that to the people of Asia we seem to be one. Any union which is exclusively white and English-speaking will be an all-out aid to Japan.
2. We ought immediately to assure the Chinese of our determination to keep them with us on an equal basis with England. If the President could speak definitely on this point it would be most valuable to us. If China could be wholly re-

-6-

assured, then half the danger would be gone.

3. But words alone will not reassure. A Chinese said the other day in a confidential conversation, "It is considered here that our war with Japan is chronic and so we are sent no help. Help is sent to places where war is considered acute. But five hundred planes, which could have been sent to us at any time, but were not, would have made it possible for us now to have attacked the Japanese strongly on the flank."

Again: (quoted from a Chinese) "We begged that American planes and warships might not be so concentrated as they were in Hawaii and the Philippines. It has been our experience that this present war cannot be fought on the old methods of concentration. Dispersion is the word. But no heed was given to us or to our experiences, although we have been fighting the Axis longer than anyone has. Now we think with acute regret of those planes which were destroyed within a few hours. We could have won the war with them."

Again: (quoted from a Chinese source) "We have put the whole of Free China at the disposal of the Allies for airfields. Dispersed airfields make an inferior airforce able to stand off a superior one."

Again: "China has a feeling of let-down. She longed for the entry of America into the war

-7-

after all these years of struggle. Instead of having been given any relief, however, she is being asked to send soldiers to Burma and Indo-China."

Again: "If China does not soon have help she will collapse economically. It has become a pressing problem to Chiang Kai-shek to know how to feed and pay the Chinese army."

Again: "The great danger is that England and the United States will fight this war as colonial war. But it is not a colonial war. It is a total war, and total war requires political and spiritual values as well as military."

Again: "Why does not the United States realize the great strength for the Allies that is in the spirit of the Chinese people? Only the Chinese are fighting a total war in Asia against the Axis. The peoples of The Philippines, Malaya, India, are all fighting on soil that is not their own - they fight as colonists of an empire. But China is fighting as America is, for its own country. The real union ought to be between non-imperialistic China and non-imperialistic

America."

(All quotations from Chinese and Filipino.)
What action can be taken and taken at once to reassure China first and then the other allies in Asia of our independence and our determination to include them in democracy?

-8-

- a. There should be a continuing conference of strategy in Washington - not London, for the people of Asia strongly distrust England, but are inclined to and want to trust the United States. At this conference China ought to be represented on completely equal terms with England and the United States.
- b. Decisions as to allocations of war supplies should be taken in joint consultation, and care should be taken that General Wavell does not bring a colonial officer's mind to bear upon the Chinese.
- c. There is particularly in Washington much drawing-room talk against China, and the Chinese know it. People say, "After all, can you trust the Chinese?" "What can the Chinese do?" "Why don't the Chinese do something?" This is unjust talk for the Chinese have been doing a great deal for years, and have had no help as yet, and it hurts the Chinese.
- d. The press should be told that in speaking of Japan which include our allies also, they must not use racial terms nor should any terms be used which would seem to disparage our allies on racial and geographical grounds. At present the ignorance of newspapermen and columnists is such - even of famous columnists like Walter Lippman - that unwittingly they insult our allies in Asia.

-9-

4. Our generals and military men may be actually as dangerous as they are helpful in winning this war. Today war has to be won through the mind as well as through armies and weapons. The Japanese, like the Germans, are fighting a total war - not merely measuring arms. But many military men, American and English, seem unable to grasp this fact. It is natural to them to think in the old-fashioned terms of weapon against weapon, army against army. There ought to be complete liaison between Wavell and Chiang Kai-shek - political as well as military. It is doubtful whether Wavell can do this, and therefore he must be supplemented by others who can help him. China is fighting with full political consciousness but as yet we are not, nor is England. Generals can not seem to understand the new war. They think this war will be fought and won by tanks and airplanes only. Military men only know how to stand up to tanks and airplanes.

5. Next to China, the Netherlands East Indies are fighting a total war. There are 400,000 Dutchmen in the Indies who have no home now in Europe. This is the greatest concentration of white forces in Asia. There are only 80,000 Englishmen in India. Every use ought to be made of the spiritual force of the Dutch who are

-10-

really fighting for freedom. Free men can
fight ten times as well as colonials.

6. Australia, so far as I understand it, shows
the same potential strengths. This can be con-
firmed by a talk with Mr. Casper, the
Australian minister.
7. Finally, the imperative first step, which
should be taken at once in order to reassure
China, our strongest ally, and to cut the
sinews of Japanese propaganda, is two-fold -
 - (a) a clear statement made by the President
that we are fully aware of the importance of
the Axis war in the Orient and that there is
no danger of our giving it secondary attention.
 - (b) Immediate help sent to China, even if it
is only a comparatively small number of airplanes.

In closing this memorandum, I must respectfully call
attention to the fallacy of believing that the Axis can be de-
feated if Germany is alone defeated. Germany must be defeated,
but if Japan is allowed to get her fascist grasp upon Asia, upon
the resources and the peoples there, we Americans will find an
enemy stronger to fight than Germany ever was, because Japan is
an enemy more deeply grounded in fascist thinking than Germany's,
and one far richer, if victorious, than Germany can be except in
her dreams.

I must point out that long before Germany conceived
the idea of the Nazi regime, Japan had evolved it completely.
Study of historical records will show clearly the same scheme of

-11-

government, based on force, on contempt of the masses, on rejection of democracy, on aggressive warfare, on the use of lies and trickery and propaganda as weapons. As early as the middle of the sixteenth century this regime began to emerge. Korea alone saw it, for she saw herself as its first victim, as indeed she was. The present world war, of which the first world war was only a stage, may be directly traced to the period in which Japan began her definite aggressive policy by seizing Korea. Today's history only repeats that past event in broken treaties and useless promises. It is interesting to discover the direct relation between Germany and Japan in the development of fascism in Europe. That the relation is direct no one can doubt, and Japan was the primary source.

To ignore these facts, to believe that if Germany is defeated we can easily defeat Japan, is therefore ignorance of the most dangerous sort. A Japan victorious in Asia will be not one whit less dangerous to us than a Germany victorious in Europe is to England and to us. Nor would England perhaps be able to give us much help if Japan were to gain English strongholds in Asia. We must not count upon the loyalty of India, or upon the help of Russia. The success of Russia in the present war has only augmented the feeling of new power among the peoples of Asia. There are thousands of Asiatics in the Russian army. India particularly is being influenced by Russian successes. Russia has a special appeal for Asia today.

As for China, I must call attention to her right to be called a democracy, perhaps more truly a democracy than we or England have ever been. China has long practiced a real

-12-

democracy, though on a plan different from the western plan, and it is natural that great distrust is aroused all through Asia when China ^{is not} solidly included with England and the United States, where she believes she belongs, ~~coresponding~~ ^{as} ~~the~~ ^{is} ~~the~~ ~~issue~~ ~~would~~ ~~be~~ ~~immediately~~ ~~undermined~~. When China ~~was~~ not put on terms of equality with England and the United States, either actually or in planning, it is worth battleships and bombers to Japan in furnishing proof of what she is telling the peoples of Asia. Japan is trying to make this war a race issue, and we Americans ought to do everything we can to cut across race. It would be to our interest to insist that China be given an equality even if she did not altogether in all ways deserve it in order that Japan be proved wrong. But anyone who knows China will not allow that she is undeserving of equality. The war of defense whereby China has kept Japan from victory for four and a half, now nearly five years, will one day be written down in history as a masterpiece of strategy in defensive warfare. China's democracy is as real as our own, the basic difference being in its form rather than in its effect. It is a decentralized democracy whereas western democracy has always been centralized.

I submit, therefore, not as my own opinion alone, but as the consensus of opinion of many thoughtful persons in Asia, persons of various races and nationalities, that the great danger to the United States today is to become identified with England in the minds of the peoples of Asia. We have a good record in Asia, comparatively speaking. We are not feared there for past imperialisms. Our future in Asia may be one of great influence and friendly

-13-

strength or it may be full of danger. Let us combine our union with England only with an equal union with China, let us maintain our own policies toward the nations of Asia, and let us demonstrate to the peoples in Asia our determination to maintain our independence while we fight with full strength for democracy for all.

W. J. D. 2/2/42
FBI - NY

February 9, 1942

Miss Pearl S. Buck
40 East 49th Street
New York City

Dear Miss Buck:

I have your letter about The East and West Association. I believe that the purpose of this organization which you are founding is a most useful one, and that the plan outlined in your memorandum is sound.

I shall be glad to do anything I can to further the project, and will be pleased to receive information about your work as it develops.

Sincerely,

Murphy; Foy

William J. Donovan

Colonel Donovan:

2/4/42

The following has been suggested by Mr. Hayden as a reply to the attached letter:

"I believe that the purpose of the "East and West Association" which you are founding is a useful one, and that the plan which you have outlined in your memorandum is sound. I shall be glad to do what I can to further this project and will be pleased to receive information about your work as it develops."

Outs

JAMES P. BAXTER, ^{2nd} Ans.

card indicate the edges of
the camera field

Dr. Baxter
from DR Murphy



January 2, 1942

Telegram -- official

RICHARD J. WALSH
PERKASIE, PENNSYLVANIA

WILL BE GLAD TO SEE YOU AND PEARL BUCK
IN WASHINGTON ON MONDAY.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

H. W. B.
Buck

The East and West Association

Devoted to mutual knowledge and understanding
of the life of the Oriental and the American peoples

Forty East Forty-ninth Street, New York City

PEARL S. BUCK
President
CHARLES S. PHARIS
Treasurer

Board of Directors

MANCHESTER BODDY
LOUIS BROMFIELD
PEARL S. BUCK
MRS. JAMES E. HUGHES

HENRY R. LUCE
MARGARET MEAD
CLARK H. MINOR
JAMES Q. NEWTON
RICHARD J. WALSH

Advisory Board
(In formation)

ADRIAAN J. BARNOUW
ROBERT M. FIELD
OWEN LATTIMORE
LIN YUTANG
GRECC M. SINCLAIR

January 26, 1942

My dear Colonel Donovan:

The Board of Directors of the East and West Association want you to be among the first to know of the founding of this organization, its purpose, and what we hope to accomplish through its activities.

The East and West Association was planned a long time ago by a small group of persons who are familiar with Far Eastern countries. We felt that in our modern world it was increasingly necessary to work for real understanding between the peoples of the east and the west. We feel that this is now crucial because of the war. Not only future peace but victory itself depends upon understanding which cuts across color and race and geography, and aims straight at the hearts and minds of people.

The enclosed memorandum tells of the plans of the organization and the channels we will use in developing its program more fully. We shall not duplicate the work of any other organization. Our purpose is not relief; our interests are not "humanitarian," but broadly human. We shall do no research; we mean not to collect new knowledge, but to disseminate widely the knowledge we already have.

We shall appreciate your inquiries and suggestions and we would like to send you from time to time further information about our work as it develops.

Sincerely yours.




MEMORANDUM BY PEARL S. BUCK

East and West today are one. War has swept the peoples of the world together and whether we are ready for this union or not, we have been forced to it by necessity. The union will continue, whether we want it or not, after the war is over. Not the western peoples alone will make this war, nor will western peoples alone make the peace after the war. For the first time in human history the whole human race must shape the world.

It is more essential today than ever, therefore, that the peoples of the East and West understand each other in all possible ways. We must know each other. Our faces, our ways of living, our feelings and thoughts must be familiar and comprehensible to each other. But such understanding can only be based upon knowledge and we have not that knowledge. Our allies, the Chinese, are still strange to us, and we are strange to them. Our present enemies, the Japanese, are still less known, and still more strange to us, and we to them. We do not know our own Oriental people, the Filipinos, nor the peoples of India or of Thailand, or of the Netherlands East Indies, nor do they know us. We do not even know very well New Zealand or Australia, those great western islands in the eastern seas, nor even Russia, a continent whose people is more eastern than western. Nor do those know us any better. Outward circumstances have compelled us now to closeness, but inwardly we are still separate because of our ignorance of each other's peoples.

There has been some interchange between East and West in the upper ranges of culture, but in the spirit of the times this interchange must now be between peoples and peoples. For such interchange, therefore, and for the now understanding necessary today, the East and West

- 2 -

Association, a non-profit corporation, has been organized. Its purpose is to help ordinary people on one side of the world to know and understand ordinary people on the other side, in terms which ordinary people can grasp.

The East and West Association does not duplicate the work of any existing group. It seeks to use and spread more widely, through varied means comprehensible to the average person, the results of the studies and activities of other organizations as well as of informed individuals.

The immediate means, planned so far, of disseminating this human knowledge include:

1. Radio programs, national, local and overseas.
2. The sponsoring of motion pictures, documentary and otherwise.
3. An authentic illustrated monthly magazine.
4. Organizing in many places forums and discussion groups, and supplying study programs to these and other groups.
5. Maintaining an information service and reference library in New York.
6. Fostering the translation of the writings of East and West into their several languages.
7. A monthly news-letter for members.

The Association will use any and all other possible mediums of exchange between the peoples of the eastern and the western world.

* * *

January, 1942

1108
1500

January 3, 1942

Dear Mr. Nelson:

To enable the Coordinator of Information to present data in visual form to the President and to persons designated by him, approval was given by him to the construction and equipping of a building which will be operated by this organization.

Actual construction of the building is to be under the direction of the Public Buildings Administration. Three of the country's foremost industrial designers, Mr. Raymond Loewy, Mr. Henry Dreyfuss, and Mr. Walter Dorwin Teague, have completed preliminary sketches for the structure, and are now working on interior arrangements and contents. The Office of the Coordinator is to be responsible for the purchase and installation of all equipment.

We have now reached the point of ordering models for some of the equipment to be installed. Certain experimental work is necessary in addition, as some of the equipment is being designed and constructed specifically for the building. This equipment consists of mechanical, electrical, photographic, and related items.

In order to secure delivery on necessary supplies, materials, and services, without delay, it is essential, as you know, to have a project rating as low in the "A" series as possible. I would appreciate your personal assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. Donald W. Nelson, Executive Director
Supply, Priorities, and Allocations Board
Washington, D. C.

Richard Foy
cc - Mr. Richards
Mr. Early
Mr. Barnes

D R A F T

January 8, 1942

Dear Mr. Nelson:

To enable the Coordinator of Information to present data in visual form to the President and persons designated by him, approval was given by him to the construction and equipping of a building which will be operated by this organization.

Actual construction of the building is to be under the direction of the Public Buildings Administration. Three of the country's foremost industrial designers, Mr. Raymond Loewy, Mr. Henry Dreyfuss, and Mr. Walter Dorwin Teague, have completed preliminary sketches for the structure, and are now working on interior arrangements and contents. The Office of the Coordinator is to be responsible for the purchase and installation of all equipment.

We have now reached the point of ordering models for

- 2 -

some of the equipment to be installed. Certain experimental work is necessary in addition, as some of the equipment is being designed and constructed specifically for the building. This equipment consists of mechanical, electrical, photographic, and related items.

In order to secure delivery on necessary supplies, materials, and services, without delay, it is essential, as you know, to have a project rating as low in the "A" series as possible. I would appreciate your personal assistance in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

Mr. Donald M. Nelson
Executive Director
Supply, Priorities, and Allocations Board
Washington, D. C.

Delegated 11-28

BUILDING

DEC 8 1941

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I am attaching for your information a copy of my letter of this date to the Administrator of the Federal Works Agency relative to the building for your presentation activities.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) HAROLD D. SMITH
Director.

Attachment
CD
Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information.

T. P. ↑

Walsh 2606
Buck

WUB8 42 NT

PERKASIE PENN DEC 31 1941

COL WILLIAM J DONOVAN

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

PEARL BUCK AND I ANXIOUS TO SEE YOU IN WASHINGTON
MONDAY JANUARY FIVE ON MATTERS OF URGENT IMPORTANCE WITH
REGARDS TO RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND OTHER ASIATIC COUNTRIES
STOP MAY WE HAVE APPOINTMENT EARLY MONDAY AFTERNOON
PLEASE WIRE HOME ADDRESS PERKASIE PENNSYLVANIA

RICHARD J WALSH.

815AM

Even No. 1151

[Exposure is 1/25 Q. S. 6.3]

Buck, Pearl 2606

JAN 12 1942

R. D. 3
PERKASIE, PENNSYLVANIA

Pearl Buck

January 9, 1942.

Colonel William Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I enclose the memorandum which you suggested
that I send to you. I believe that it covers
the main points in our conversation.

I must apologize for the delay of a few days.
I wanted to check some of my sources and to
have further talk with some persons whom I knew
would correct my material where it was wrong or
corroborate it with further experience.

It was a great pleasure to meet you and to know
how much is being done already. I was very en-
couraged by the President's last speech which it
seemed to me showed awareness of some of the prob-
lems.

Yours very sincerely,

Pearl S. Buck

Pearl S. Buck

PSB HS
Enc.